In
February 2014, the people of Ukraine managed to topple their government by way
of prolonged protest which was in part a call for the Eastern European nation
to move closer to Europe and away from Russia.
The
deposed Russian-backed President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovych sparked the wrath
of the Ukrainians by refusing to sign a ‘trade agreement’ that would have
brought Ukraine closer to the EU. Instead he preferred closer ties with Russia
which is sort of creating its own ‘EU’ called the Customs Union.
This
paper posits that Ukraine has been a battleground for power both between the
West and Russia (external power) and that of the state versus the citizens (Internal).
The
paper will try to lay bare the various power struggles that were and are at
play in the Ukrainian crisis and conclude that with the West looking like
having won, the power play has only begun as Russia will not allow a nation so
close to it and vital to its prestige get aligned with the West, its
arch-enemy.
Before
the Ukraine case can be tackled, it is essential to discuss the notion of power
as it occurs in the discipline of International Relations. It will also feature
a summary of two prescribed course readings on Power.
Theory of Power in IR
The
concept of power is one of the hotbeds of political scientists as it is yet to
have one definition agreed upon and yet very important in the study of
International Relations (IR).
Power broadly put denotes the capacity of agents to bring about intended
changes, or the ability to overcome obstacles. Power in international relations
may be defined as a state’s ability to control, or at least influence, other
states or the outcome of events that are somewhat significant.
One
of the most widely used delimitations of Power comes from Robert A. Dahl (1957).
Dahl’s definition is useful in trying to marry the various terms that can
be interchanged with the term ‘power,’ terms like; influence, control, coercion,
force, persuasion, deterrence, compellence, inducement and so on.
Dahl suggested that underlying most such terms
is the basic intuitive notion of A causing (or having the ability to cause) B
to do something that B otherwise would not do. Where A is the influencer or
nation with power and B is the one being coerced.
Barnett
and Duvall (2005) warn however that Dahl’s view of power which dominates the
study of IR ignores some crucial aspects of power.
In
their paper, Power in International
Politics, Barnett and Duvall warn that the Dahl’s dominant view of power obscure
the full nature of power and call for the study of other forms of power going
on to say that without an adequate understanding of the nature of and the ways
in that power can differently affect different situations, the current work
that is available on the concept of power is not powerful.
The
two offer four forms of power namely; compulsory power, institutional power,
structural power and productive power which they present in a 2 by 2 box (see
figure below). The two axes are separated based on the degree to which they
emphasize the interaction of different units being closely occurring in
space/time, and secondly the degree to which power operates through specific
actors or through socially relationships.
The
two argue that power in general terms, is the production, in and through social
relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their
own circumstances and fate.
“The
first dimension concerns whether power works in interactions or social
constitution. One position on this dimension treats social relations as
composed of the actions of pre-constituted social actors toward one another.
Here, power works through behavioral relations or interactions, which, in turn,
affect the ability of others to control the circumstances of their
existence…The other position consists of social relations of constitution.
Here, power works through social relations that analytically precede the social
or subject positions of actors that constitute them as social beings with their
respective capacities and interests” Barnett and Duvall (2005:9).
The
second core analytical dimension concerns how specific—direct and immediate—are
the social relations through which power works.
Compulsory
power means direct control over another and the classic illustration of which
is Dahl’s definition where power is the ability of A to get B to do what B
otherwise would not do.
The
two however add that ‘Compulsory power is not limited to material resources and
also includes symbolic and normative resources” (15).
Structural
power is the direct and mutual constitution of the capacities of actors.
“Structural
power shapes the fates and conditions of existence of actors in two critical
ways. One, structural positions do not generate equal social privileges;
instead structures allocate differential capacities, and typically differential
advantages, to different positions…Two, the social structure not only
constitutes actors and their capacities; it also shapes their
self-understanding and subjective interests” (18).
Institutional
power means actors’ control over socially distant others
“Specifically,
the conceptual focus here is on the formal and informal institutions that
mediate between A and, as A, working through the rules and procedures that
define those institutions, guides, steers, and constraints the actions…and
conditions of existence of others, sometimes even unknowingly” (15)
Productive
power leads to the production of subjects through diffuse social relations.
“Productive
power and structural power overlap in several important respects…Yet structural
and productive power differ in a critical respect: whereas the former works
through direct structural relations, the later entails more generalized and
diffuse social processes…productive power…is the constitution of all social
subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and discursive
practices of broad and general social scope” (20).
“This
difference between direct and diffuse social relations of constitution has two
important implications for thinking about productive power. First, productive
power concerns discourse, the social processes and the systems of knowledge
through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and
transformed…Second, discursive processes and practices produce social
identities and capacities as they give meaning to them…Discourse, therefore, is
socially productive for all subjects, constituting the subjectivity of all
social beings of diverse kinds with their contingent, though not entirely
fluid, identities, practices, rights, responsibilities and social capacities”
(20-1)
Thomas Volgy, Lawrence Imwalle
and John Schwarz in their paper Where is the New World Order? Hegemony,
State Strength, and Architectural Construction in International Politics also tackle the question of power.
The trio start by quoting scholars who say that after the Cold War, a new type
of international system which is based on economics has emerged.
Before the Kosovo conflict, a
joint Russian/Chinese statement on their willingness to pursue a “multipolar
world” also stressed that “no country should seek hegemony … or monopolize
international affairs” (Gordon, 1997:A3). Soon after the Kosovo conflict began,
Chinese official organs publicly denounced America’s “global strategy for world
hegemony” (Eckholm 1999).
Even France wondered that
America seemed imperialistic in its leadership of NATO.
All this to speak of a vacuum
that formed after the Cold War. Obviously, with the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, America emerged a mild victor and along with the rest of the West can be
said to be the new hegemon.
The
trio starts by discussing the notion of a hegemon and suggest that a typical hegemon
enjoys to types of power.
“...hegemonic strength can be viewed from two
different perspectives (Strange 1989). One is through the concept of structural
power: the capability and willingness of the hegemon to create essential rules,
norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of the international
system. The hegemon enjoys “structural power through the capacity to determine
the terms on which those needs are satisfied and to whom they are made
available” (Strange 1989:165-6).”
Apart
from structural power, Strange suggests Relational power which is the capabilities of the hegemon vis-à-vis other
actors in the system, and its ability to get some groupings of others, by
persuasion or coercion, to do what they would not otherwise do.
Relational
power is measurable by looking at the economy and size and strengths of the
military while structural power requires a more complex approach to gauge.
The
paper then asks if the United States is a Hegemon and finds that while
economically the US is stronger than any other nation, it fails to satisfy the
requirements of a hegemon when relational power is inspected using the External
Strength Index.
The
paper then concludes that despite the US being weak in terms of external
strength, its policy makers parade and speak in hegemonic terms and will
continue to do so which includes the expansion of NATO.
But
tables are turning for the US, suggests the paper.
“At the same time, such efforts at leadership have begun to encounter
substantial resistance. NATO allies are chaffing against US terms for NATO
expansion and the US has been unable to stop the thawing of Russian/Chinese
relations to combat US ‘hegemony’. In the economic realm, the 1997
parliamentary elections in France may have provided a first indicator of
growing resistance to the American model of economic growth, with its attendant
social welfare costs for wealthy democracies. Recently, French, Russian and
Third World policy makers have challenged as well the right of the US to set
rules for their multinationals to operate in regions identified by the US as
friendly to global terrorist activities (Cohen 1997)
…without a much stronger commitment of resources
to develop a new, global architecture, American interest in developing new
global architecture may be insufficient to create new forms of global order.
American ‘hegemony’ without additional capabilities will probably dissipate
under the onslaught of greater interdependencies, domestic constraints,
increasing systemic complexities, and the numerous states chaffing against US
leadership.”
The
problem is being compounded by the fact that the US’ old enemy is no longer a
bigger threat to make the US policy makers to attribute more resources to boost
external strength.
The
paper ends with a disclaimer saying the US should not be written off and has
not been dormant since the cold war and that it is and will continue to be a
force to reckon with in international affair especially because there are
weaker rivals to challenge it.
On
the theoretical level, neo-realists, the crucial feature of any system is the
distribution of material power, and hence the dominant political reality of the
post-Cold War order is the preponderance of the United States. (Hurrell, 2006)
For
institutionalist liberals, globalization and ever denser networks of
transnational exchange and communication create increasing demand for
international institutions and new forms of governance. Institutions are
important in helping to explain how new norms emerge and are diffused across
the international system, and how state interests change and evolve.
Systemic
liberals build on many of the same core ideas but develop a broader Kantian
image of the gradual but progressive diffusion of liberal values, as a result
partly of liberal economics and increased economic interdependence, partly of a
liberal legal order coming to sustain the autonomy of a global civil society,
and partly of the successful example set by the multifaceted liberal capitalist
system of states. (Hurrell, 2006:7)
Russia
has been on the decline since the Cold War ended, the reality of the past two
decades here has been one of decline and the dissolution of power.
Nevertheless, its foreign policy is focused on trying to arrest that decline
and seeking to reassert regional and global influence. (Hurrell, 2006:2)
Ukraine
and its value
Ukraine
Ukraine
is Europe’s second largest country seated on top or Romania and the Black Sea
and half wedged into Russia. With a
population of 45 million people, Ukraine only got independence in 1991 after
the Soviet Union fell apart.
Since
then, the country has been caught between moving towards joinining the
European Union and reconciling with Russia.
The
Russian factor in Ukraine is a very important factor, Russian is widely spoken
in Ukraine, and Russia provides most of Ukraine’s energy needs and despite
countries from Europe being its biggest trading partners, Russia is the biggest
single trading partner to Ukraine.
Russia’s
Black Sea Fleet is also based in Ukraine and this Ukraine joining NATO would
mean a big blow to Russia.
Russia,
wanting to revive its influence on Ukraine has in the ‘punished’ Ukraine for
moving towards Europe and has managed to have leaders such as Yanukovych dance
to its tune.
In
2006, Ukraine was forced to agree to pay almost twice the former price for
Russian gas after Russia briefly to cut supplies in a move that sparked alarm
in Western Europe as well. In January 2009, Russia again cut gas supplies in a
row over unpaid fees.
To
Russia, Ukraine is very important as it provides a buffer between it and NATO
and losing it to the West would leave Russia feeling naked as Putin once
remarked in 2005, the very dissolution of the Soviet Union was "a real
drama." He said the break-up of the
USSR in 1991 left tens of millions of Russians outside the Russian Federation.
Putin
of course wants Ukraine in the Eurasian Union, which is widely seen as Russia’s
answer to the emergence of the EU.
The
EU on the other hand, would get a boost of confident to have one more member
added to the club at a time when some members such as Britain want to leave the
Union. The EU is also eying the electricity and gas exports and the heavy
industry that produce anything from war ships to planes bigger than Jumbo jets.
And
apart from 45 million more consumers, Europe will use Ukraine to prevent Russia
from sliding back westward.
So
obviously, Ukraine is important to both Russia and EU. It has so far managed to
balance between the two hegemons all this while but in reality, it has always
been toyed by Russia while being lured by the EU.
Barrack
Obama and policy makers from the EU have pleaded with Russia not to see
Ukraine’s going West as a zero-sum game but it remains just a plea.
So
far, Russia has pulled out its Ambassador from Kiev, has suspended the huge
loan it offered Ukraine, apparently as a move to influence it. The Russians has
also declared that the interim government in Ukraine is illegal and branded it
a mutiny
Some
of those so called Russians are Ukrainians that live in the east of the country
and favour stronger ties with Russia and would be happy to join Russia again
while those in the east of the country see Europe as the future and want to
break away from Russia.
When
Ukraine announced that it wanted to sign a trade agreement with the EU,
Russia’s influence surfaced.
Russian
health inspectors found fault with Ukrainian sweets, Russian customs officials
slowed down cross-border traffic and Russia's energy giant Gazprom reminded
Ukraine's Naftogaz of its huge debt.
But this coercion was only after Russia failed to entice Ukraine with
significantly lower gas prices, large-scale industrial co-operation projects,
and soft credits.
The
rest is now history.
In
November 0f 2013, President Victor Yanukovych's government refused to sign an
accord that would have meant greater co-operation with the European Union and
instead pivoted to Russia.
That
deal that Yanukovych refused among other things demanded that the former Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko who until her release in 2014 had spent 2 years in
jail.
Thousands of people, especially from the west
of the country, outraged that a long-standing aspiration for integration with
Europe had been ditched overnight, poured into central Kiev for peaceful protests
occupying the Independence Square, known as Maidan and the crisis was to drag
on until the end of February.
And
despite Obama’s sweet talk, which analysts have said is fear of pushing Putin
too far at a time the US wants him in Syria, Iran and other trade issues, his
government is still rooting for the pro-EU camp in Ukraine and a leaked tape of
the US officials suggests that the US role might be bigger in the background.
United
Kingdom Foreign Secretary William Hague was quoted at the height of the Ukraine
protest saying: "It's in the interests of the people of Ukraine and Russia
to trade with the European Union."
He
added: "It's important that Russia doesn't do anything to undermine that
package... We don't know, of course, what Russia's reaction will be."
Hague
added that he would talk to the Russians to try to reason with them that Ukraine
was not a zero-sum game.
George
Osborne, the Chancellor of Britain announced
that his country and the EU were ready with a chequebook to help the Ukrainians
who are almost bankrupt and deep in debt. The debt was to be alleviated by
Russia’s loan package which is now in limbo with the fall of the pro-Russian
regime.
As
of February 26, there were still fears that the country might see Russian
troops coming in to intervene, but so far Putin has not made a move yet.
Hegemonic stability theory states that the
international system stays stable if only one hegemon is in power, and so far
for Ukraine, Russia has always been the hegemon and with the fall of the Soviet
Union. Now a new hegemon is in town and as the theory states, instability is
prevailing.
The
newswire AFP quoted Russian Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev saying If Ukraine
goes ahead with signing a partnership deal with the European Union Moscow will
punish it by raising import duties on Ukrainian goods.
This
apart from withholding the $15 billion loan package and calling the interim
government illegitimate.
While
Russia throws in tough cards, the West has been buoyed by Ukraine’s brave moves
and many European parties and organizations such as the International Monetary
Fund have said they stand ready to pump cash into Ukraine.
So,
in theory, Russia which has power and influence over Ukraine looks to have
fallen to the attraction (soft power) of the EU, which really did not do a lot
of stunts to actively woo Ukraine. And the EU being a new and rising hegemon is
eager to partner with the US to counter Russia which is also trying to wake up
as a new hegemon.
Russia
can cause a war in Ukraine by fanning the Pro-Russian sentiment in the east, it
can directly intervene and restore the order it wants. It can squeeze the
insolvency of Ukraine even more by raising tax on Ukrainian exports to Russia
or it can raise the prices of gas and freeze Ukraine to submission.
Doing
this however would only push Ukraine further West which seems ready to assume
the burden of the ailing state.
The
EU have little options in Ukraine, they can defend it from a Russian invasion
which would only trigger World War 3 and this option might now even be possible
with the rigidity of the EU and the reluctance of some members such as Germany
to involve in war.
The
EU can only play underground politics, appeasing Russia by appealing to
international law while letting the protest movement which is pro-EU pivot to
Brussels and naturally boot out Russia. The EU can also cause Ukraine to break
up into two with one part going east.
The
US can challenge a Russian invasion, but lessons from the Russian-Georgia war
indicate that the stakes are not big enough with the elections coming up soon
and domestic politics taking center stage in the US.
The
only option the US has is to support the protest movement and to engage the Russian
machine in diplomacy to let it take defeat without losing too much face.
That
is on an external power note.
Internally, the power play in Ukraine was between state and citizens and
on a lesser extent between eastern citizens and western citizens.
The
state had all the material power that a realist would think as enough to get by
on, but it lacked the moral support and was faced with a citizenry that in part
was also materially equipped. Thus influence, force and power of the state
failed to beat the moral power of the population and the population won.
The
future looks dark for Ukraine however, as power politics will continue between,
on the inside, those that are pro-Russia and those that want Brussels and on
the outside, those from the West and those from Russia.
The
game will largely rely on Putin, which the hegemon with most to lose incase
Ukraine moves to the EU. As the paper went to print, Putin had ordered his army
to practice for war,
a tactic Morgenthau would describe as psychological show of power to Ukraine
and NATO.
The
Russian Parliament quickly gave Putin power to invade Ukraine and Obama and
Nato warned Russia that there would be consenquences if it used troops in
Ukraine, but the warning was too late and Russian troops were said to be in
Crimea already and had a say on business there, including knocking down the
internet and telephone services.
Now
the ball
In
a nutshell, Power is the ability of any actor to persuade, influence, force or
otherwise induce another actor to undertake an action or change an objective
that the latter would otherwise prefer not to do. It is also the ability of one
actor to persuade, influence, force or otherwise induce an actor to refrain
from an action it would prefer to undertake.
Power
can be seen in the population of a country, its size, its natural resources,
its industrial capabilities, its leadership and its diplomatic ability among
others.
The
paper has discussed the notion of power and hegemony and used it to argue that
the Ukrainian crisis is more about power politics between Russia and the West.
Bibliography
Barnett,
Michael N. and Raymond Duvall. (2005). Power
in global governance. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Guzzini,
S (2010) Power analysis: Encyclopedia
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Hurrell, A (2006) Hegemony,
liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?
International Affairs 82, pp 1-19
Michael
Barnett and Raymond Duvall Power in
International Politics (No date)
RT
(2014) Putin orders ‘combat readiness’
tests for western, central Russian troops
Thomas
J. Volgy, Lawrence E. Imwalle and John E. Schwarz Where is the New World Order?
Hegemony, State Strength, and Architectural Construction in International
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